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Casenote

Laurel Heights Improvement Association
of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of the
University of California: The Lucas
Court's First Look at CEQA

Prior to enactment of the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA),' environmental "costs" did not enjoy the same level of
consideration as economic costs in public agency decisionmaking'
By mandating that potential adverse environmental impacts of a
project be publicly considered, and avoided where possible,
CEQA's requirements implement the legislature's stated goal to
maintain a quality environment in California for future
generations Because the Act applies to both state and local
government, CEQA further ensures that public agencies develop
implementing procedures to protect environmental quality.4 The
broad application of CEQA to all levels of governmental agencies
in California makes the Act an important tool to ensure that
environmental considerations are a part of public agency
decisions.' The basic purpose of CEQA is to ensure that
governmental decision-makers and the public are informed of the

1. CAL.PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1990).
Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California EnvironmentalQuality Act, 18 U.C.
2.
DAVIS L. REv. 197, 202 (1984) (describing CEQA as the solution for the failure of government
agencies to fully consider the environmental consequences of their decisions).
3. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(a) (Deering 1987).
4. Id. § 21001(0.
Id. § 21063 (defining a public agency as "'any state agency, board, or commission, any
5.
county, city and county, city, regional agency, public district, redevelopment agency, or other political
subdivision").
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potentially significant environmental effects' of proposed projects,'
and to avoid their adverse effects by identifying alternatives to, or
mitigation measures for, the project.8
Since its enactment in 1970, CEQA has been interpreted by the
California Supreme Court on eighteen occasions. Early California
Supreme Court decisions interpreting CEQA read the Act broadly
to afford the highest level of protection towards the environment."°

6. Id. § 21068 (defining significant effect on the environment as "a substantial, or potentially
substantial, adverse change in the environment"). See also 14 CAL. CODE REos. § 15382 (1986).
7.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (Deering 1987). Section 21065 describes a "project" as:
(a) Activities directly undertaken by any public agency.
(b) Activities undertaken by a person which are supported in whole or in part
through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from
one or more public agencies.
(c) Activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license,
certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.
Id.
8.
See id. § 21002.1(b). See also 14 CAL CODE REOS. § 15002(a) (1986) (stating that the
purpose of CEQA is to provide information to the public and decisionmakers and to prevent
significant, avoidable damage to the environment by requiring changes in proposed projects).
9.
See Russ Bldg. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. 3d 839,750 P.2d
324, 244 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988), Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma,
Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1157,728 P.2d 1202,232 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1986); Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa,
Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agric. Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 929, 727 P.2d 1029, 231 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986); People
ex rel Deulmejian v. Mendocino County, 36 Cal. 3d 476,683 P.2d 1150,204 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1984);
IT Corp. v. Imperial County, 35 Cal. 3d 63, 672 P.2d 121, 196 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1983); National
Audubon Socidty v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983);
Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 32 Cal. 3d 779, 654 P.2d 168, 187
Cal. Rptr. 398 (1982); Industrial Welfare Comm'n v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 690, 613 P.2d 579,
166 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1990), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 1029 (1980); Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc.
v. City Council of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980);
California Hotel and Motel Ass'n v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 25 Cal. 3d 200,599 P.2d 31, 157
Cal. Rptr. 840 (1979); Horn v. Ventura County, 24 Cal. 3d 605,596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718
(1979); Peterson v. City of Long Beach, 24 Cal. 3d 238, 594 P.2d 477, 155 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979);
Citizens Task Force On Sohio v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs of Port of Long Beach, 23 Cal. 3d 812,
591 P.2d 1236,153 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979); Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City
of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Bozung v. Local Agency
Formation Comm'n of Ventura County, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975);
No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974); Desert
Env't Conservation Ass'n v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 8 Cal. 3d 739, 505 P.2d 223, 106 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1973); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d
1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
10. DiMento, Dozier, Emmons, Hagman, Kim, Greenfield-Sanders, Waldau & Woolacott,
Land Development and Environmental Control in the CaliforniaSupreme Court: The Deferential,
the Preservationist,and the Preservationist-ErraticEras, 27 UCLA L. REV. 859, 905 (1980)
(analyzing land development and environmental control cases decided by the California Supreme
Court from 1967 to 1979, and concluding that during that time the court had been pro-preservationist,
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LaurelHeights ImprovementAssociation ofSan Francisco,Inc.
v. Regents of the Univ. of California1 is the first CEQA case to
reach the California Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice
Malcolm Lucas. 2 In Laurel Heights, the court considered the
adequacy of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR)"3 certified by
the Regents of the University of California (hereinafter
"Regents")." The EIR was prepared to identify and mitigate
significant adverse environmental effects associated with the
relocation of the San Francisco campus' pharmaceutical biomedical
research facilities."s The proposed relocation site included an
existing building in the mixed residential and commercial
neighborhood of Laurel Heights. 6

as opposed to development-oriented, in its outcomes, and that decisions did not turn on whether one
of the parties to the suit was a governmental agency).
11. 47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988), modified, 47 Cal. 3d 982A
(1989).
12. The following five justices joining in the unanimous court decision were appointed by
Republican Governor George Dcukmejian: Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas, and Justices Edward A.
Panelli, John A. Arguelles, David N. Eagleson, and Marcus M. Kaufman. K. ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA
CoURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK (1988). The two remaining justices include Justice Stanley J. Mosk,
appointed by Governor Pat Brown, and Justice Allen E. Broussard, appointed by Governor Jerry
Brown. Id. To date, three of the Deukmejian judges have resigned from the high court: Justices
Arguelles, Kaufman, and Eagleson. Cox, The Exodus From California'sHigh Court,NAT'L LJ., May
14, 1990, at 3, col. 2. Governor Deukmejian has or will name their replacements. Id. Justice Marvin
Baxter was confirmed on August 28, 1990. Hager, Panel OKs Governor's Choicefor High Court,
Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1990, at A3, col. 1. Since the LaurelHeights decision, the court has
addressed the matter of an exemption from CEQA. See Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 50 Cal. 3d 370, 787 P.2d 976, 267 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1990). In addition, the court
has agreed to review a CEQA case concerning the breadth of consideration of project alternatives.
See Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Cal. App. 3d 48, 264 Cal. Rptr. 587
(1989), review granted788 P.2d 1154, 268 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1990).
13. CAL PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21100.1 (Deering 1987) (setting forth the requirements
of an EIR). Section 21100 provides in part: "All state agencies.., shall prepare... and certify the
completion of an environmental impact report on any project they propose to carry out or approve
which may have a significant effect on the environment." Id& See also 14 CAL. CODE REOS. §§
15120-15132 (1986).
14. For this project, the Regents were both the project proponent and the public agency in
charge of approving the project and certifying the EIR as adequate under CEQA. Laurel Heights,47
Cal. 3d at 388-89, 764 P.2d at 280-81, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29.
15. The EIR disclosed that research at the facility would include the use of toxic chemicals
which could impact human health. UNriisrry oF CALiFORNIA, SAN FRANcIsco, LAUREL HEIGMrrs
SITE DEVELOPMENT PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, at F-44 (June 1986).
16. Laurel Heights,47 Cal.3d at 388,764 P.2d at 280, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428. See infra notes
97-108 and accompanying text (describing the facts of the Laurel Heights case).
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In keeping with the broad interpretation of CEQA
requirements, first articulated in Friendsof Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors of Mono County,'7 the court in Laurel Heights found
the EIR prepared by the Regents inadequate in its discussion of the
future use of the site and in its treatment of alternatives to the
proposed project." In making this determination, the court set out
a new test to determine when future action related to the proposed
project must be analyzed.' 9 Additionally, the court indirectly
resolved the confusion regarding analysis of project alternatives and
mitigation measures created by the Court of Appeal for the Second
District in Laurel Hills Homeowners Association v. City Council."
The California Supreme Court found that the Laurel Hills decision
did not stand for the premise that where mitigation measures are
presented in an EIR, there is no need to discuss alternatives to the
proposed project."'
Not all of the issues were decided against the Regents,
however. The court, in its first review of a 1984 amendment2 ' to
CEQA, allowed use of the site to continue while the flaws in the
EIR were being corrected.' In addition, the court found that
substantial evidence existed to support the Regents' finding that the
proposed mitigation measures for the project were adequate.24
Part I of this Note discusses the legal background of CEQA,
including the sections of the Act which generated the controversies
presented in the Laurel Heights case.' Part II summarizes the
facts of Laurel Heights, and reviews the California Supreme

17. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). See infra notes 73-83 and
accompanying text (discussing the Friends of Mammoth decision).
18. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 427, 764 P.2d at 306, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
19. Id at 396, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
20. 83 Cal. App. 3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978). See infra notes 84-96 and accompanying
text (discussing Laurel Hills decision).
21. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 402-403, 764 P.2d at 289-290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437-438.
22. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1213, sec. 1, at 4161 (enacting CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21168.9).
23. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 422, 764 P.2d at 303, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
24. Id at 407, 764 P.2d at 293, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
25. See infra notes 28-96 and accompanying text.
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Court's analysis of the case.' Finally, Part III sets forth the legal
ramifications of the court's decision in Laurel Heights.'
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

The California Environmental Quality Act

Pressure from the environmental movement in the 1960s and
early 1970s resulted in the promulgation of several new laws at
both the federal and state levels aimed at protecting the nation's
natural resources.' Following the lead of Congress, which enacted
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969," the California
Legislature in 1970 enacted the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA). 30 CEQA set forth legislative policy that
environmental protection was a matter of statewide concern." In
addition, CEQA required that environmental concerns be given
greater consideration in public decisionmaking.32
1. CEQA's Requirements
Current provisions of CEQA apply to all discretionary
projects33 approved or carried out by a public agency, unless

26. See infra notes 97-197 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 198-218 and accompanying text.
28. A QuarterCentury ofActivism Erected a Bulwark of Laws, CONG. Q., 153, 155 (January
20, 1990). See, e.g., Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§
1857-58(a) (1970); Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
30. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1990).
31. Id. § 21000 (Deering 1987).
32. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
33. 14 CAL. CODE REGS. § 15357 (1986) (defining a discretionary project as a "project which
requires the exercise of judgment or deliberation when the public agency or body decides to approve
or disapprove a particular activity").
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specifically exempted from the Act.' A public agency considering
a discretionary project must first determine if the project may have
any significant adverse impact on the environment." If this inquiry
is answered in the affirmative, the agency is required to pursue
further analysis and prepare an EIR.' CEQA's requirements,
therefore, address both the procedural and substantive aspects by
which public agencies make development decisions. 7
Central to informed decision making, and considered the core
of CEQA," is the requirement that a written EIR be prepared and
circulated for public review if a project has potentially significant
environmental impacts. 9 Since a project may involve action by

34. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (Deering 1987). See id. 21080(b) (exempting certain
categories of projects from CEQA, such as emergency repairs carried out by a public agency). See
also id. §§ 21080.02-.08 (Deering 1987 and Supp. 1990) (exempting specific projects from
compliance with the Act).
35. Id. § 21080.1 (Deering 1987). See 14 CAL CODE REOS. § 15063 (1986). Normally a public
agency which is required to determine if an EIR is necessary will conduct an "initial study." Id. An
initial study is a preliminary analysis which aids in determining whether a proposed project will have
possible significant effects on the environment and, therefore, require an EIR to be prepared. Id. The
Act provides that a project may have a significant effect on the environment if it has the potential
to degrade the environment, may have considerable cumulative impacts, or may have direct or
indirect adverse effects on humans. Id.
36. CAL PUB. R s. CODE § 21100 (Deering 1987). See 14 CAL CODE REOS. § 15081 (1986)
(explaining decision to prepare an EIR). If there is no substantial evidence that the project may have
a significant effect on the environment, a negative declaration is prepared. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
21080(c) (Deering 1987).
37. See Robie, California'sEnvironmental Quality Act: A Substantive Right to a Better
Environment?, 49 L.A.B. BuLL 17, 42 (1973); Selmi, supra note 2, at 263-266; Comment,
Substantive Enforcement of the Environmental Quality Act, 69 CAL.L. REV. 112, 124-29 (1981)
[hereinafter Substantive Enforcement] (stating that CEQA's provisions go beyond procedural
requirements and contain substantive requirements as well).
38. See 14 CAL CODE REos. § 15121 (1986) (describing the fundamental role played by an
EIR under CEQA).
39. CAL PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21100.1 (Deering 1987) (describing the contents of an
EIR).Section 21100, as modified by section 21100.1, provides that an EIR for a development project
shall include a discussion of the following:
(a) The significant environmental effects of the proposed project.
(b) Any significant environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the
project is implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the significant environmental
effects including, but not limited to, measures to reduce wasteful, inefficient,
and unnecessary consumption of energy.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed project...
(g) The growth-inducing impact of the proposed project.
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more than one government agency, the law provides for the
designation of a lead agency which is ultimately responsible for the
adequacy of the EIR.' An EIR is then circulated for public review
in draft form." After the draft EIR has been circulated, a final EIR
addressing any comments made by interested agencies and citizens
must be certified by the lead agency before that agency may
approve or undertake the proposed project."2 A project may be
approved if all significant adverse impacts to the environment have
been mitigated to insignificant levels or, if not altered to avoid such
effects, the public body adopts specific findings of overriding
considerations.43

The report shall also contain a statement briefly indicating the reasons for
determining that various effects of a project are not significant and
consequently have not been discussed in detail in the environmental impact
report.
Id. §§ 21100-.1. See also Hildreth, Environmental Impact Reports Under the California
Environmental Quality Act: The New Legal Framework, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (1977)
(describing the general provisions of CEQA, and the preparation of an EIR in particular). See
generally M. REaY, T. THOMAS, S. DUcAN & J. MoosE, GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (1990); J. RUBENS & W. DELVAC, A PRESERVATIONIST'S GUIDE TO
TmE CALIFORNIA ENvIRoNMENTAL QUALI=Y ACT (1989); OFCE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL,
PRIER ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CALIFORNIA (1988); THE PLANNING AND CONSERVATION
LEAGUE FOUNDATION, CmZEN'S GUIDE TO ThE CALIFORNIA ENvIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (1985)
(detailing how to comply with CEQA).
40. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 21067 (Deering 1987) (defining a lead agency as the public
agency with the principal responsibility for carrying out or approving a proposed project). Other
public agencies which must also approve or carry out an aspect of the proposed project are called
"responsible agencies." Id. § 21069.
41. Id. §§ 21104,21153, 21092 (Deering 1987 & Supp. 1990) (requiring that a lead agency
preparing an EIR consult with other affected public agencies prior to completing a final report and
detailing public notice requirements).
42. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21108, 21152 (Deering 1987) (requiring a public agency to
certify whether a project will, or will not, have a significant effect on the environment prior to
approving or carrying out the project). See also 14 CAL. CODE REGS. § 15090 (1986) (stating that
the lead agency must certify that the final EIR has been completed in compliance with CEQA).
43. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21081 (Deering 1987) (requiring that if an EIR identifies
significant environmental effects of a proposed project, the public agency must find that such effects
have been mitigated to avoid the effects; that necessary changes to the project are the responsibility
of another public agency and that agency will require such changes; or that specific economic, social,
or other considerations make mitigation measures or alternatives to the project infeasible). See also
14 CAL. CODE REGS. § 15091 (1986) (describing the required findings).
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2. Subsequent Amendments to CEQA
Although minor changes to CEQA are made on a regular basis
by the legislature, the most comprehensive amendments to this act
were made in the early years after its enactment." In order to
clarify the legislature's intent in portions of the Act, major
"clean-up" legislation was signed into law in 1972.4" The
legislature's 1972 amendments were inextricably tied to the
California Supreme Court's decision in Friends of Mammoth v.
Board of Supervisors.' The main purpose of these amendments
was to codify the court's holding that private actions requiring
approval by a public agency were subject to the Act's
requirements. 7 Prior to the Friends of Mammoth decision, only
projects actually undertaken by public agencies were deemed to
require adherence to CEQA."
The amendments specified that if a private development project
requires a discretionary permit from a public agency, the project
must comply with CEQA.4 ' Another addition to CEQA at this time
44. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing 1972 and 1976 legislative
amendments).
45.
1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1154 (enacting CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21060, 21060.5, 21061,
21062, 21063, 21065, 21066, 21067, 21080, 21082, 21083, 21083.5, 21084,21085, 21086, 21087,
21088, 21089, 21090, 21108, 21152, 21154, 21160, 21161, 21165, 21166, 21167, 21167.5, 21168,
21168.5, 21168.6, 21168.7, 21169, 21170, 21171, 21172, 21172.5, 21173, 21174).
46. 8 Cal. 3d 247,502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). Faced with ambiguous statutory
language, the court interpreted the legislature's intent broadly to expand the application of CEQA to
private activities requiring public agency approval. Id. at 261, 502 P.2d at 1058, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
770. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (describing the case and the court's analysis). See
also Seneker, The LegislativeResponse to Friends of Mammoth-DevelopersChase the Will-o '-the
Wisp, 48 CAL. ST. BJ. 127, 128-30 (1973) (explaining amendments to CEQA after Friends of
Mammoth); Comment, California's Environmental Quality Act--A Significant Effect or Paper
Pollution?, 5 PAC. W. 26, 36 (1974) [hereinafter Paper Pollution] (1972 amendments partially
limited the impact of the Friends of Mammoth decision); Comment, Aftermammoth: Friends of
Mammoth andthe Amended CaliforniaEnvironmentalQualityAct,3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 349,367 (1973)
[hereinafter Aftermammoth] (1972 amendments did not alter the broad scope of CEQA as interpreted
in Friends of Mammoth).
47. Seneker, supra note 46, at 129.
48. Aftermammoth, supra note 46, at 353.
49. Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d at 266, 502 P.2d at 1061, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 773. In
addition, the court refused to delay the effective date of its decision or to make it prospective only.
Id. at 272, 502 P.2d at 1066, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 778. See also Robie supra note 37, at 39-41
(explaining the judicial review provided by this amendment); Seneker, supra note 46, at 129-130
(ramifications of court's refusal to make the Friends of Mammoth decision prospective only). The
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was the requirement that the Office of Planning and Research
prepare, and the Secretary of Resources adopt, proposed
"guidelines" for the implementation of the Act by public
agencies." The guidelines serve to clarify CEQA's provisions with
explanations, examples, and presentation of court interpretations."
Major changes to CEQA again occurred in the 1976 legislative
session." In the early 1970s, completing CEQA's requirements
was considered mainly a procedural exercise of filing the right
paper at the proper time. 3 The 1976 amendments added strong
language stating that the legislature expected public agencies to
seriously consider the merit of project alternatives and mitigation
measures.' The amendments also contained statements concerning
the use of EIRs, and required findings for project approval." The
articulated legislative policy embodies the most substantive aspect
of CEQA, which forbids agencies from approving a project as
proposed when feasible alternatives or mitigation measures are
available that would substantially lessen a project's significant

scope of judicial review under CEQA was clarified as well. CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21168,21168.5
(Deering 1987).
50. CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 21083. Prior to the 1972 amendments, CEQA required the Office
of Planning and Research, together with other state and local agencies, to prepare procedures for the
preparation ofERs. Afermammoth, supra note 46, at 366. See 14 CAL CODE REGS. §§ 15000-15387
(1986) (guidelines and procedure for the preparation of EIRs).
51. The guidelines were first adopted by the Secretary for Resources in 1973 and most
recently updated in 1986. M. REMY, T. THOMAS, S. DUGOAN & J. MoosE, supra note 39, at 4-5. The
guidelines state that they "are binding on all public agencies in California." 14 CAL CODE REGS.
§ 15000 (1986). California courts place great weight on the directions given in the guidelines, but
to date have not specifically ruled on whether the guidelines should be considered binding
regulations. See, e.g., Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of the
Univ. of California, 47 Cal. 3d 376, 391 n.2, 764 P.2d 278, 282 n.2, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430 n.2
(1988). See also Selmi, supra note 2, at 280-81 (judicial treatment of the guidelines gives them the
equivalent effect of regulations).
52. See 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1312 (enacting CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21002, 21002.1,21003,
21060.3, 21061.1, 21064, 21068, 21069, 21081, 21082.1, 21092, 21100.1, 21151.5, 21167.1;
amending CAL- PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21050, 21061, 21080, 21082, 21083, 21084, 21085, 21087,
21089, 21100, 21168, 21168.5).
53. Comment, Substantive Enforcement,supra note 37, at 115 (prior to the 1976 amendments,
CEQA was mainly procedural). But see Robie, supra note 37, at 20-22 and 39-43 (CEQA prior to
1976 should be read as having substantive provisions).
54. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1312, sec. 1.5, at 5889 (enacting CAL PuB. RES.CODE § 21002.1(b).
55. Id. sec. 1, at 5888-89 (enacting CAL PUB. REs. CODE § 21002); id. sec. 1.5, at 5889,
(enacting CAL PUB. Ras. CODE § 21002.1(a)).
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environmental effects. 6 In addition, required findings were added
to ensure that a public agency make changes or alterations to a
project pursuant to an EIR's recommendations so that significant
environmental impacts are avoided. 7

56. Id. sec. 1, at 5888-89 (enacting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002); id. sec. 1.5, at 5889
(enacting CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21002.1). Section 21002 reads in part:
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the state that public
agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there are feasible
alternatives or feasible mitigation measures available which would substantially
lessen the significant environmental effects of such projects, and that the
procedures required by this division are intended to assist public agencies in
systematically identifying both the significant environmental effects of
proposed projects and the feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures
which will avoid or substantially lessen such significant effects.
CAL PuB. REs. CODE § 21002 (Deering 1987). Section 21002.1 provides in part:
In order to achieve the objectives set forth in 21002, the Legislature finds and
declares that the following policy shall apply to the use of environmental
impact reports prepared pursuant to this division: (a) The purpose of an
environmental impact report is to identify the significant effects of a project
on the environment, to identify alternatives to the project, and to indicate the
manner in which those effects can be mitigated or avoided. (b) Each public
agency shall mitigate or avoid the significant effects on the environment of
projects it approves or carries out whenever it is feasible to do so.
Id. § 21002.1. See Rural Land Owners Ass'n v. City Council, 143 Cal. App. 3d 1013, 1023, 192 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 332 (1983) (an EIR's conclusion that significant environmental impacts would be
"partially mitigated" did not comply with CEQA's mandate to "avoid or substantially lessen"
adverse impacts). See also Inyo County v. Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 203, 139 Cal. Rptr
396, 408 (1977) (a major function of an EIR is to insure that all reasonable alternatives to a project
are thoroughly assessed by the responsible public agency).
57. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1312, sec. 9, at 5892 (enacting CAL PuB. RES. CODE § 21081). Section
21081 provides in part:
[No public agency shall approve or carry out a project for which an
environmental impact report has been completed which identifies one or more
significant effects thereof unless the public agency makes one, or more, of the
following findings:
(a) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated into, such
project which mitigate or avoid the significant environmental effects thereof
as identified in the completed environmental impact report.
(b) Such changes or alterations are within the responsibility and jurisdiction of
another public agency and such changes have been adopted by such other
agency, or can and should be adopted by such other agency.
(c) Specific economic, social, or other considerations make infeasible the
mitigation measures or project alternatives identified in the environmental
impact report.
CAL PuB. REs. CODE § 21081 (Deering 1987). See City of Poway v. City of San Diego, 155 Cal.
App. 3d 1037, 1046, 202 Cal. Rptr. 366, 371 (1984) (required findings ensure that alternatives or
mitigation measures in an EIR have been considered and there is some disclosure of the analytic
reasoning of the decisionmaking agency). See also Village of Laguna Beach, Inc. v. Board of
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As CEQA litigation developed, legislators began to consider
whether courts should have greater flexibility to fashion remedies
which were both consistent with the Act's provisions and sensitive
to the legitimate concerns of developers." Developers complained
that CEQA provisions resulted in unnecessary delays of proposed
projects. 9 In response to these complaints, the legislature in 1984
enacted California Public Resources Code section 21168.9 to
specify the orders that a court may enter in cases of noncompliance
with CEQA. 6 Prior to this addition, courts faced with a failure to
comply with CEQA generally declared the approval of a project
void, without attempting to fashion alternative equitable
solutions."' This addition to the Act was interpreted by the
California Supreme Court for the first time in the Laurel Heights
62

case.

Only recently has the legislature again materially amended
CEQA.6 ' This 1988 refinement of CEQA was prompted by a
survey of public agencies which indicated that these agencies
generally did not monitor construction of a project to be sure that
there was compliance with any conditions placed on that project as

Supervisors, 134 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1034, 185 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1982) (board's findings were
insufficient where only one of four alternatives was discussed and where no explanation was given
for rejecting that one alternative); Cleary v. Stanislaus County, 118 Cal. App. 3d 348, 361-62, 173
Cal. Rptr. 390, 397 (1981) (county may not approve a final EIR where it has failed to make findings
concerning the avoidance or mitigation of significant adverse environmental effects identified in the
report).
58. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 1079 (May 21, 1984)
(on file at the Pacific Law Journaloffice).
59. l
60. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1213, sec. 1, at 4161 (enacting CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21168.9). See
Selmi, supra note 2, at 199-201 (describing several procedural changes made to CEQA in 1984).
61. Letter from Robert K. Break to Maxine Harris Brookner (July 25, 1983) (proposing
legislation dealing with the remedial powers of a court when CEQA has been violated) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal office). But see Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastside County Water
District, 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 709, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, 205 (1972) (the court used its equitable power
to fashion a remedy to prevent undue delay to dissolve an injunction at the time the project proponent
complied with CEQA).
62. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco v. Regents of the Univ. of California,
47 Cal. 3d 376, 422, 764 P.2d 278, 303, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 451 (1988).
63. 1988 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 1232, sec. I, at 4636 (Deering) (enacting CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21081.6) See R. Pestor & R. Bass, Mitigation Monitoring and Reporting, CALIFORNIA
PLANNER, 5 (January/February 1989). See also M. REMY, T. THOMAS, S. DUGAN & J. MOOSE,
supra note 39, at 129 (to date, this amendment has not come under judicial scrutiny).
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part of the project's approval.' Without follow-up on project
approvals, it is difficult to determine whether mitigation measures
identified in EIRs are being implemented, or, if implemented,
whether they are successful.' The 1988 legislative act greatly
enhances the substantive effect of CEQA by requiring permitting
agencies to adopt a reporting or monitoring program for any project
mitigation measure at the time it makes findings on an IIR.'
Though amendments to CEQA since its enactment touch upon
several important aspects of the law, court interpretations have
played an equal, if not greater role in defining the requirements of
the Act.'
B. Case Law
Application of CEQA on a case-by-case basis has resulted in
the litigation of a wide range of issues.' Court decisions have
played a critical role in explaining and enforcing implementation
of CEQA's provisions.' One of the main issues in a cause of
action under CEQA is the adequacy of the contents of an EIR7
For the most part, when determining the adequacy of an EIR, the
courts look for a good faith effort at full disclosure of information

4.. SENATE COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL
3180 (June 21, 1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal office). See R. JOHNSON & W.
MCCARTNEY, LocAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER TiE
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AcT (July 1988).
65.

SENATE COMMfTrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OROANIZATON, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL

3180 (June 21, 1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journaloffice).
66. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6 (Deering Supp. 1989) (providing that when a public
agency makes its required findings it must "adopt a reporting or monitoring program for the changes

to the project which it has adopted or made a condition of project approval in order to mitigate or
avoid significant effects on the environment"). It.
67. Selmi, supra note 2, at 209 (discussing the impact of court cases in interpreting CEQA).
68. Id. at 208.
69. See generally Goldman, Legal Adequacy of EnvironmentalDiscussionsin Environmental
Impact Reports, 3 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (1982) (setting forth a conceptual analysis of EIR
adequacy, based upon judicial reasoning in CEQA cases); Selmi, supra note 2 at 201-202 (judicial
role under CEQA has been pervasive).
70. Selmi, supra note 2 at 208 (in CEQA litigation, the adequacy of the contents of an EIR
is one of the three main issues most often addressed by courts).
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required by CEQA." The Act specifically provides the judicial
standard of review in examining public agency decisions.'
1. Setting Forth a Broad Interpretationof CEQA: Friends of
Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors
The California Supreme Court first interpreted CEQA in the
landmark case, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors.73
The issue in this case was not whether an EIR was adequate, but
rather whether the project had to meet CEQA's requirements at
all.74 In Friends of Mammoth, the Board of Supervisors of Mono
County had granted approval to a private corporation for the
construction of condominiums." The approval was granted without
considering whether an EIR was necessary.76 To this point,
government agencies had followed CEQA only when the agency
was the entity actually undertaking the development project.' In
Friends of Mammoth, however, the court looked at whether a
public agency's decision to issue a permit for a private citizen's
proposed project required compliance with CEQA." After
analyzing the meaning of the term "project" as used in CEQA, the
71. See Goldman, supra note 69, at 9 (courts are more likely to find that an EIR is inadequate
if something critical to an informed evaluation of the project's environmental consequences is
missing). On the other hand, a challenge to the adequacy of a discussion that does appear in the EIR
will likely fail. Id. See also Selmi, supra note 2, at 236-41 (the standard to determine adequacy is
not well defined and courts have shown little inclination to thoroughly weigh the claim that an EIR
is inadequate).
72. CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21168, 21168.5 (Deering 1987). Section 21168 provides that
when an agency has held a public hearing to certify an EIR, "'the court shall not exercise its
independent judgment on the evidence but shall only determine whether the act or decision is
supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record." Id. § 21168. Section 21168.5
restricts the court's inquiry, in cases where no public hearing is held, to whether there was prejudicial
abuse of discretion, and states: 'Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded
in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial
evidence." Id. § 21168.5.
73. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
74. Id. at 252, 502 P.2d at 1052, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
75. Id
76. id. The case was brought to court by an incorporated property owners' association and an
individual. Id. at 253 n.2, 502 P.2d at 1052 n.2, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 764 n.2.
77. See Seneker, supra note 46 at 128 (the Act was thought to refer only to projects actually
undertaken or funded by public agencies).
78. Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d at 253, 502 P.2d at 1052, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 764.
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court determined that the Act applied to projects undertaken by
private entities when such projects required discretionary approval
by a public agency."9
In its decision, the California, Supreme Court proclaimed that
CEQA must be interpreted so "as to afford the fullest possible
protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the
statutory language."" This strong statement, made only two years
after enactment of CEQA, ensured that the Act's provisions would
be interpreted broadly both by lower courts and implementing
government agencies.81 The outcome of Friends of Mammoth
turned CEQA from what might have been a relatively little-used
law into an important legal tool for ensuring that environmental
concerns are addressed in the project planning stage, before
development projects are issued permits.82 The supreme court has
continued to rely on this first CEQA decision to give broad
meaning to the Act's requirements.83
2. Current Confusion at the Appellate Level: Laurel Hills
Homeowners Association v. City Council
When an EIR is required, CEQA provides that the document
should discuss alternatives to and mitigation measures for the
project to reduce any possible adverse effects on the
environment. ' If a project, as proposed, will adversely effect the
environment, mitigation measures or project alternatives may still
allow the project to proceed in a modified form." These two

79. Id. at 266, 502 P.2d at 1061, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
80. Id. at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
81. Selni, supra note 2 at 211 (describing the impact of the Friends of Mammoth decision).
82. See, Comment, Environmental Decision Making Under CEQA: A Questfor Uniformity,
24 UCLA L. REV. 838, 841 (1977) (CEQA was virtually ignored immediately after its enactment).
83. See, e.g. Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Education, 32 Cal. 3d
779, 797, 654 P.2d 168, 180, 187 Cal. Rptr 398, 410, (1982); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation
Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 274, 529 P.2d 1017, 1024, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 256 (1975) (both cases
quoting the "fullest possible protection" language of Friends of Mammoth).
84. CAL. PUB. Rs. CODE § 21002.1(b) (Deering 1987).
85. Id. § 21081. See 14 CAL- CODE PEGS. § 15091 (1986).
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elements of an EIR are therefore critical to both protecting the
environment and the project proponent's expectations.
Today, confusion exists over whether project alternatives and
mitigation measures are interchangeable criterion in an EIR
discussion. This confusion exists largely because of an appellate
decision handed down in the late 1970's.86 The EIR prepared in

Laurel Hills Homeowners Association v. City Council7 included
an analysis of a proposed 124-unit single-family lot subdivision and
eight alternatives to the proposed project.88 A sixty-three unit
cluster configuration alternative was identified as the most
environmentally superior project in the EIR." In approving a
ninety-five lot single-family subdivision, however, the public
agency made no finding that the environmentally superior
alternative was not feasible.90
The Court of Appeal for the Second District determined that
a specific finding that the identified superior alternative is not
feasible was unnecessary.9 The court reasoned that CEQA's goal
of protecting the environment was met if the adverse environmental
effects of the project were mitigated to eliminate those adverse
impacts.' The court of appeal, therefore, did not find it necessary
to consider the feasibility of environmentally superior alternatives
that were contained in the EIR.93 This controversial conclusion has
not been reviewed by the California Supreme Court.' However,
the decision in Laurel Hills has been criticized by other appellate

86. See Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515,521, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 845 (1978) (stating that imposing mitigation measures without considering project
alternatives is sufficient because CEQA speaks of them in the alternative). But see CAL PUB. RES.
CODE § 21002 (Deering 1987) ("public agencies should not approve projects as proposed if there
are feasible alternatives or mitigation measures available") (emphasis added).
87. 83 Cal. App. 3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978).
88. Id. at 522, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 523, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
91. Id. at 520, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
92. Id. at 520-21, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
93. Id. at 521, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
94. See M. REaiY, T. THOMAS, S. DuGGAN & J. MoOSE, supra note 39, at 12-13.
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courts and by several authors.' Despite this criticism, the Regents
in Laurel Heights used the reasoning in Laurel Hills to support the
proposition that an EIR is adequate if it discusses either mitigation
measures or project alternatives, but that it need not discuss both.'
I1. THE CASE

A.

The Facts

In 1985, the Regents of the University of California purchased
the former headquarters of the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
in order to alleviate space constraints at their San Francisco
Parnassus campusY The Fireman's Fund building is located in the
Laurel Heights neighborhood of San Francisco, which is a mixed
residential and commercial area. 8 Although the purchase of this
building is a "project" under CEQA, the Regents did not prepare
an EIR at the time because they maintained that the new location
would be used for administrative and academic functions that
would have no significant effect on the environment."

95. See Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the University of California, 205
Cal. App. 3d 354, 368, 238 Cal. Rptr. 451, 459 (1987) ("We respectfully disagree with the Laurel
Hills reasoning and decline to follow its holding"). Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mount
Shasta, 198 Cal. App. 3d 433, 444 n.lO, 243 Cal. Rptr. 727, 733 n.10 (1988) (court noted that the
Laurel Hills case had been criticized by scholars and distinguished the case on its facts). See also
Selmi, supra note 2, at 263-66 (the Laurel Hills court misapplied the Friendsof Mammoth decision
and used an open-ended term by requiring only that environmental damage be reduced to an
-acceptable level"); Comment, Substantive Enforcement, supra note 37, at 124-27 (the LaurelHills
court misinterpreted CEQA's language by finding a distinction between requiring mitigation measures
or alternatives to a project); Comment, CEQA 's Substantive Mandate Clouded by Appellate Court,
8 ENvrL. L. REP. 10208, 10210 (1978) (the Laurel Hills decision is unsupported by any prior case
interpreting CEQA).
96. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 402, 764 P.2d at 289, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
97. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 47 Cal. 3d 376,388,764 P.2d 278,280,253 Cal. Rptr. 426,428 (1988), modified, 47 Cal.
3d 982A (1989).
98. Id
99. Id. The California Attorney General argued, however, that an environmental analysis
should have been prepared prior to the purchase of the building in keeping with CEQA's intent and
specific direction given in the guidelines that "CEQA compliance should be completed prior to
acquisition of a site for a public projecL" Attorney General Brief of Amicus Curaie at 11, Laurel
Heights (No. S001922) (quoting 14 CAL CODE REos. § 15004(b)(1) (1986)). See supra note 7
(defining the term "'project"). See also Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 553 P.2d 537,
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The decision to prepare an EIR resulted from the Regents'
proposal to move the School of Pharmacy from the existing
campus, in the Parnassus area of San Francisco, to the newly
purchased building in Laurel Heights." ° An EIR was necessary at
this juncture because some of the scientific research proposed for
the site involved the use of toxic chemicals, carcinogens, and
radioactive substances. ' Though this building contains 354,000
square feet of interior space, the EIR covered only the immediate
use of 100,000 square feet of area for the School of Pharmacy's
biomedical research units.1°2
The Regents' EIR purported to show that, despite the fact that
the relocation could result in significant levels of toxic air
emissions being vented from the building, the emissions could be
reduced to insignificant levels. 3 This conclusion was based on
two studies of the existing biomedical facility. ' Conclusions in
the EIR were also predicated upon the supposed lack of toxic air
emission regulations, and a lack of definitive research showing
adverse health impacts from expected laboratory emissions. "°
Alternatives to the proposed relocation were rejected in the EIR as
unfeasible in one and one-half pages of text."°e After a forty-five
day review period and a public meeting, the Regents certified the
final EIR as meeting CEQA's requirements."°e Residents

132 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1976) (holding that a categorical exemption from CEQA will be overturned when
it is shown that a project may have significant effects).
100. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 389,764 P.2d at 280, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428. The Parnassus
campus is located two miles southwest of the Laurel Heights neighborhood and houses the schools
of Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, and Dentistry. I at 388, 764 P.2d at 280, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
101. Id at 389, 764 P.2d at 280, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
102. Id at 393, 764 P.2d at 283,253 Cal. Rptr. at 431. Consolidation of the scattered School
of Pharmacy facilities was a secondary objective mentioned in the draft EIR. Id. at 389, 764 P.2d at
280, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
103. Id. at 389, 764 P.2d at 280, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
104.
I at 408, 764 P.2d at 294, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 442. The university had conducted
environmental sampling studies in 1984 and 1986 at the existing Parnassus campus. These studies
had concluded that there were no statistically significant increases in the deposition of organic
chemicals or radioactive material in the neighborhood area as a result of research activities at the
campus. Id.
I at 410-11, 764 P.2d at 294-95, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43. The court stated that it was
105.
unclear from the record whether such emissions were wholly unregulated. Id.
106. I at 403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
107.
i at 389, 764 P.2d at 281, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
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surrounding the Laurel Heights location objected to the Regents'
decision."
The Laurel Heights Improvement Association (hereinafter
"Association"), a neighborhood group formed specifically to
oppose this project, filed for a writ of mandamus to set aside the
certification of the EIR.'" While the Association argued that the
EIR was inadequate on several grounds, the Association's main
contention was that the EIR should have discussed the university's
ultimate planned use of the entire building for biomedical research
as part of the proposed project."' Additionally, the Association
argued that the EIR failed to discuss alternatives to the proposed
project,.. and lacked substantial evidence to support a finding that
mitigation measures would reduce adverse impacts to
insignificance."'
The Association's petition was denied in superior court."' On
appeal, the Court of Appeal for the First District reversed." 4 The
court of appeal agreed with all of the Association's contentions,
and held that the EIR was inadequate because it incompletely
described the project, insufficiently analyzed alternatives, and
lacked substantial evidence to show that all significant impacts had
1 In response to the appellate court's decision, the
been mitigated."
Regents filed a petition for review on the merits, which the
California Supreme Court granted. 6

108. l
109. Id
110. Answer Brief of Plaintiff Laurel Heights Improvement Association at 18-27 (S00 1922).
The university was committed to ultimately turning 80 percent of the building space into an area for
basic science programs. Id at 20. An additional argument offered by the Association was that a
project's cumulative effects must also be analyzed in an EIR. Id. at 24.
111. Id at 27-43. The Association also argued against the Regents' assertion that the burden
of identifying feasible alternatives shifts to the party attacking the adequacy of the EIR. Id. at 37-38.
112. Id. at 43-57. The Association noted that the EIR identified ten significant impacts overall,
but the Association highlighted the impact on air quality as particularly disturbing. Id. at 44.
113. San Francisco Superior Court Action No. 862850, Lucy Kelly McCabe, Judge (concluding
that the EIR complied with CEQA requirements and was properly certified).
114. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 205 Cal. App.
3d 354, 238 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1987).
115. l at 358, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
116. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 47 Cal. 3d 376,
390, 764 P.2d 278, 281, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 429 (1988), modified, 47 Cal. 3d 982A (1989).
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B. The Opinion
In a unanimous opinion, the California Supreme Court affirmed
117
the finding by the court of appeal that the EIR was inadequate.
The court gave broad meaning to the intent of CEQA and
reaffirmed the principle first stated in Friends of Mammoth,"'
declaring that CEQA is designed to give the fullest possible
protection to the environment." 9 Specifically, the court agreed that
the EIR should have discussed any anticipated future uses and that
the analysis of project alternatives was inadequate. 2 ' However,
the supreme court reversed the appellate court's determination that
the EIR failed to present substantial evidence that the
environmental impacts would be mitigated to insignificant
levels.' In addition, the court determined that the proper remedy
was to allow the university to presently occupy the site, but to
require the Regents to cure the EIR's flaws prior to any
expansion."
1. Analysis of Future ProjectExpansion
The supreme court held that the EIR was inadequate because
it did not discuss the additional environmental effects that could
result from the university's use of the remaining portion of the

117. Id. at 427, 764 P.2d at 306, 253 Cal. Rptr. at. 454.
118. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Friends ofMammoth case).
119. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 390, 764 P.2d at 281, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 429. The court
emphasized that, "It is, of course, too late to argue for a grudging, miserly reading of CEQA.' Id.
(quoting Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 274, 529 P.2d 1017, 1024,
118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 256 (1975)).
120. Id. at 393,399,764 P.2d at 283, 288,253 Cal. Rptr. at 431,436. See infra notes 123-140
and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of future uses); notes 141-161 and accompanying text
(discussing the analysis of alternatives).
121. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 407,764 P.2d at 293,253 Cal. Rptr. at 441. See infra notes
162-179 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of mitigation measures).
122. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 422, 764 P.2d at 303, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 451. See infra notes
180-197 and accompanying text (discussing judicial remedies). The supreme court also awarded
attorney's fees to the Laurel Heights Improvement Association and remanded the case to the court
of appeal for a prompt determination of the amount of attorney's fees, payable immediately. Laurel
Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 427, 764 P.2d at 306, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
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building when it became available." The Regents argued that
such analysis was unnecessary because they had not yet formally
approved any particular use of the remaining space." While the
supreme court agreed with the appellate court's final conclusion,
the supreme court's analysis on this point differed from the
reasoning of the appellate court."z Rather than finding the project
description incomplete, as the court of appeal had, the supreme
court focused on the need to discuss the significant cumulative
effects of the proposed project in the EIR.2 6 The supreme court
stated that the decision whether to analyze future actions involves
a balancing of whether future plans are too speculative versus the
possibility of ignoring environmental concerns if such review
occurs too late.'27 The court set forth a two-part inquiry to
determine whether an analysis of the environmental effects of
future actions is necessary in an EIR.' The court's test requires
an EIR to include an analysis of a future activity's impacts if such
activity "(1) is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the initial
project; and (2) the future expansion or action will be significant
in that it will likely change the scope or nature of the initial project
or its environmental effects." 9 The court noted that this standard
incorporates the principle that a project may not be split into
separate proposals to avoid an inquiry into environmental
impacts."3 The court sought as well to avoid premature
environmental analysis on merely speculative activities because the

123. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 399,764 P.2d at 287, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 435. Only 100,000
square feet were immediately available to the university, because the other portion was leased to the
California Department of Transportation until 1990. Id. at 393, 764 P.2d at 283, 253 Cal. Rptr. at
431-32.
124. Brief for Respondent (Regents) in Response to Briefs of Amici Curiae at 4-14 (No.
S001922) (the university's general intention to fully occupy the remainder of the building does not
equal a specific proposal requiring environmental analysis under CEQA).
125. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 394 n.6, 764 P.2d at 284 n.6, 253 Cal. Rptr at 432 n.6.
126. Id.
127. Id at 395, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
128. Id at 396, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
129. Id
130. Id (citing Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263,283-84,529 P.2d
1017, 1031, 118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 263 (1975)) (CEQA does not allow a large project to be chopped
into several small projects, which individually may have a minimal impact on the environment).
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analysis would be meaningless and financially wasteful.' The
court concluded that its test contains clear boundaries that do not
require prophecy in making a determination whether to analyze the
impacts of future activities in an EIR."'
The court then applied its test to the Regents' anticipated use
of the Laurel Heights building."' As far as the Laurel Heights
research facility was concerned, both of the court's requirements
were satisfied, indicating that an analysis of future effects was
necessary." 4 The Regents argued that despite proclamations by
university officials as to possible future uses, the Regents
themselves had not formally acted to approve any course of action,
and therefore, such plans should still be considered speculative. 3 '
The court rejected this argument, noting that an EIR always
involves some degree of forecasting and a public agency must use
its best efforts to disclose all that it reasonably can." In applying
its two-part test, the court concluded first that public and private
disclosures by university officials detailed general types of future
activities at the facility which were reasonably foreseeable." 7
Second, these disclosures described anticipated uses which would
add greatly to the amount of biomedical research to be conducted
at the site."' The additional biomedical research had the potential
to greatly increase the amount and type of harmful effects above
and beyond those immediately proposed for the site, and thus a
discussion concerning this additional activity was warranted." 9

131. Id. at 396, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433. "Under the standard we have
announced, it is therefore indisputable that the future expansion and general type of future use is
reasonably foreseeable." Ida
132. Id. at 398, 764 P.2d at 287, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
133. Id at 396-97, 764 P.2d at 285-86, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34.
134. Id at 397-98, 764 P.2d at 286, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
135. Id
136. Id at 399, 764 P.2d at 287-88, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 435-36. The court also stated, "It is the
substance of the evidence, not the source alone, that matters." Id. at 398, 764 P.2d at 286, 253 Cal.
Rptr. at 434.
137. Id at 397, 764 P.2d at 286, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
138. Id In a public newsletter, republished in the final EIR, university officials stated that the
best use of the Laurel Heights facility would be to develop it as a biomedical research facility when
the building became fully available. Id. Additionally, in private correspondence the Chancellor
confirmed that at least 80 percent of the building would be devoted to biomedical research. Id.
139. Id at 398, 764 P.2d at 286, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
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The court provided some guidance to the Regents on curing this
defect by pointing out that, at a minimum, the EIR should analyze
the general environmental effects of reasonably foreseeable future
uses and provide currently anticipated measures to mitigate adverse
impacts. " Lack of a discussion of future impacts was not the
only defect in the Regents' EIR, however.
2. Analysis of Alternatives
The court also found the EIR deficient under CEQA because
the EIR did not contain an adequate description of project
alternatives.14" ' The Regents had argued, using the reasoning of
Laurel Hills,'2 that a discussion of alternatives in the EIR was not
necessary because the Regents had provided for mitigation of the
adverse environmental impacts of the project within the EIR.'43
Alternatively, the Regents argued that the EIR did in fact contain
an adequate discussion of alternatives to the proposed project.'"
On the first point, the court observed that mitigation measures
are not imposed on a project until the project is approved, and
project approval does not occur until after an EIR is finalized. 4 '
Noting that the Regents had used Laurel Hills as the only
precedent for their position, the court rejected the premise that if
a project's adverse environmental effects can be mitigated, an EIR
need not discuss alternatives.'" Because an EIR is written and

140. Id at 398,764 P.2d at 287, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 435. The court found the Regents' situation
analogous to two previous cases where EIRs were found inadequate for not including a general
discussion of the probable construction of a pipeline in connection with an oil company's proposal
to drill a well. Id. The eventual construction of a pipeline is, of course, contingent upon finding oil;
nevertheless, such a project is a likely action in connection with drilling a well. Id. See No Oil, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 196 Cal. App. 3d 223, 233, 242 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 (1987); Whitman v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 88 Cal. App. 3d 397, 414-15, 151 Cal. Rptr. 866, 876 (1979).
141. Laurel Heights,43 Cal. 3d at 399, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
142. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing Laurel Hills).
143. Laurel Heights 43 Cal. 3d, at 399, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
144. Id at 399-400, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The court pointed out the
inconsistency of the Regents' reasoning that alternatives were not necessary, versus the argument that
the alternatives were adequately discussed in the EIR. Id. at 400 n.9, 764 P.2d at 288 n.9, 253 Cal.
Rptr. at 436 n.9.
145. Id at 401, 764 P.2d at 289, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
146. Id at 402, 764 P.2d at 289, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
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certified prior to putting conditions on a project to gain its

approval, a project cannot be considered mitigated within
an EIR;
41 7
'
mandatory.
is
alternatives
of
discussion
a
therefore,
The court distinguished the issues of Laurel Heights from those

presented in Laurel Hills, thereby sidestepping a direct resolution
of the confusion created by the Laurel Hills decision."4 The
Laurel Heights court specifically stated that, contrary to the

Regents' contention, the issue in the Laurel Hills case was not
whether alternatives had to be discussed in an EIR, but whether
alternatives adequately discussed in an EIR and found to be
superior to the proposed project must be addressed in the findings
14
by decisionmakers.

In making this distinction, the court

emphasized that under CEQA, an EIR must meaningfully discuss
both alternatives to the project and mitigation measures.'" The
court's determination on this point, however, does not contradict
directions given by the Laurel Hills court since the determination
'5 1
was directed at an issue different from the one in Laurel Hills.

Having concluded that an alternatives analysis was required in
the EIR, the court next focused on the Regents' second argument:
that the EIR did, in fact, adequately discuss alternatives to the

proposed project as required by CEQA. ' -2 The Regents argued
that since they had already purchased the building, there were no

147. L The Regents had argued that CEQA speaks of alternatives and mitigations as
"*either/or.' Id. at 400-01,764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The court rejected such a reading
of CEQA as contrary to the face of the Act in its entirety and contrary to its purpose. Id. at 401, 764
P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 436. Additionally, the CEQA provisions on which the Regents relied
deal with approval of a project and not the contents of an EIR, therefore such provisions were
inapplicable. Id.
148. Id. at 402-403,764 P.2d at 289-290,253 Cal. Rptr. at 437-438. Amicus briefs specifically
asked the court to reject the reasoning of the Laurel Hills court and clear up the confusion caused
by the decision. See Attorney General Brief of Amicus Curaie at 32, Laurel Heights (No. SOO 1922);
Planning and Conservation League Brief of Amicus Curaie at 17, Laurel Heights (No. S001922).
149. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 402, 764 P.2d at 289, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437. "Laurel Hills
does not support the Regents' argument that only mitigation or alternatives, but not both, must be
discussed in an EIR.' Id. at 402-403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
150. Id. at 403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
151. See Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515,520-521, 147
Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (1978) ("It is true that an [EIR] must identify both feasible mitigation measures
and feasible project alternatives").
152. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
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Further, the Regents pointed out that
feasible alternatives.'
within their internal planning process, not detailed in the EIR,they
had considered and rejected several alternatives. 5 ' In any event,
the Regents contended that if alternatives to their proposal were
required to be analyzed in the EIR, such alternatives should be
limited to other buildings which the Regents already owned.'
The court rejected the Regents' contention that their internal,
undisclosed analysis of alternatives, which resulted in only three
alternatives being discussed in one and one-half pages of text, was
adequate.'56 The court emphasized that an EIR is a public
information document and decisions regarding alternatives must be
fully explained so as to facilitate meaningful participation and
criticism by the public." 7 Without a proper analysis in the EIR,
the Regents could not document the validity of their conclusion
that no adequate alternatives existed."'
Finally, the Regents contended that the Association, in
attacking the EIR, failed to prove that feasible alternatives were
available."9 In rejecting this line of reasoning, the court stated
that CEQA contains no language indicating that the burden was
intended to shift to the party attacking the EIR to identify
alternatives." ° The court required a new EIR to be prepared and

153. Brief for Respondent (Regents) in Response to Briefs of Amici Curiae at 25 n.25 (No.
S001922). "The question of other alternative sites, however, necessarily had been addressed months
earlier, when Laurel Heights was acquired." Id.
154. Id. at 22.
155. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
156. Id at 403-04, 764 P.2d at 290-91,253 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39. The Regents had argued that
they were fully aware that no other feasible alternatives existed because of the information generated
during their long-range planning process prior to the acquisition of the Laurel Heights building. Id.
157. Id "The Regents miss the critical point that the public must be equally informed." Id.
158. Id. at 405, 764 P.2d at 291, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
159. L In support of their position, the Regents cited cases where the party challenging the
EIR raised additional alternatives. IL at 406, 764 P.2d at 292, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 440. See, e.g., City
of Lomita v. City of Torrance, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1069-1070, 196 Cal. Rptr.538, 543 (1983);
Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Comm. v. Board of Trustees, 89 Cal. App. 3d 274, 288-289, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 594 (1979).
160. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 406,764 P.2d at 292,253 Cal. Rptr. at 440. The court noted
that in all the cases cited by the Regents, the contested EIR already contained an adequate discussion
of alternatives. Id.Additionally, these cases support the premise that it is the project proponent's duty
to identify alternatives. Id. If no feasible alternatives exist, the information reaching that conclusion
should be provided in the EIR.Id.
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gave guidance as to the level of analysis of alternatives that must
be included.'
3. Analysis of Mitigation Measures
In the most lengthy part of its decision, the court reviewed the
analysis of measures contained in the EIR intended to reduce the
proposed project's adverse environmental impacts to insignificant
levels." The supreme court reversed the court of appeal and
found that there was substantial evidence to support the Regents'
finding that the potential adverse environmental effects of the
project would be mitigated.'6 The court emphasized that its role
in review is not to determine if an EIR's ultimate conclusions are
correct but only whether, taken as a whole, they are supported by
substantial evidence.'" The main point of contention concerned
whether the facility's potential toxic air emissions had been shown
in the EIR to be sufficiently mitigated.'" Although information
concerning exactly what emissions would exist at the facility was
not presented in the EIR, the court decided that the studies'
performed by the Regents were credible enough to be considered
part of the total evidence that supported the Regents' finding of
mitigation."

161. Id at 406-407, 764 P.2d at 292, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 440. "Absolute perfection is not
required; what is required is the production of information sufficient to permit a reasonable choice
of alternatives so far as the environmental aspects are concerned." Id at 406, 764 P.2d at 292, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 440. (quoting Residents Ad Hoe Stadium Comm. v. Board of Trustees, 89 Cal. App.
3d 274, 287-289, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593-594 (1979) and Village Laguna of Laguna Beach, Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, 134 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1029, 185 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1982)).
162. Id. 43 Cal. 3d at 407-422, 764 P.2d at 293-303, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 441-451.
163. Id.at 407, 764 P.2d at 293, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
164. ladSpecifically, the court framed its inquiry as "not whether there is substantial evidence
to support the Association's position; the question is only whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Regents' conclusion." Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id
166. See supra note 104 and accompanying text for an explanation of the previous studies.
167. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 409, 764 P.2d at 294, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 442. The court
agreed that the EIR might be more useful if it included some of the additional information sought
by the Association, but the court did not feel that the evidence as a whole was less than substantial.
Ma at 422, 764 P.2d at 302, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
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The supreme court next addressed how the lack of government
regulations over the anticipated laboratory emissions affected the
need to discuss mitigation measures in an EIR.'" The court noted
that even where no environmental standards exist, it is still
necessary to mitigate significant environmental effects.t"
However, the court found in this case that the lack of governmental
regulation made it difficult to challenge the EIR's conclusion that
a certain level of emissions was not a significant environmental
impact based on current scientific knowledge. 7 ' The court then
noted that the Regents' commitment to future monitoring of the
effects of its activities could be considered as evidence of
17 1
mitigation.
Finally, the court turned to the Association's objections
concerning adequate mitigation of the adverse effects of other
environmental impacts: traffic and parking, noise, and the handling
of radioactive substances." : Taking each topic in turn, the court
found that the EIR's discussion of mitigation measures for these
areas was adequate. 73 The court found that the traffic and parking
effects were insignificant, thereby not meriting a substantive
discussion of mitigation measures. 74 Noise effects were dismissed
in a similar fashion.17 The court, however, went into greater
depth regarding the Association's concern over the handling of
radioactive waste material. 76
The Association's main contention concerning radioactive
waste material was that the university had, in the past, not
168. Id at 411, 764 P.2d at 295, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 443. See 14 CAL. CODE REos. § 15064(i)
(1986). ("Ifan emission... meets the existing standard for a particular pollutant, the lead agency
may presume that the emission or discharge of the pollutant will not be a significant effect on the
environment"). Id.
169. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 412, 764 P.2d at 296, 253 Cl. Rptr. at 444.
170. Id "Many harmful substances were used long before they were regulated. The absence
of regulation is, however, a factor that can reasonably considered in the EIR process." Id.
171. Id. See Twaine Harte Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Tuolumne, 138 Cal. App. 3d 664,
687-689, 188 Cal. Rptr. 233,246-247 (1982) (monitoring of domestic wells to ensure no degradation
of groundwater considered an adequate mitigation measure).
172. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 417-421, 764 P.2d at 299-302, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 447-450.
173. Id
174. Id at 418, 764 P.2d at 300, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
175. Id
176. Id at 419-421, 764 P.2d at 300-302, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 448-450.
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complied with regulations governing the handling of such
materials." The court, while agreeing that the university's past
record in this area is properly subject to judicial inquiry when
analyzing the adequacy of an EIR, stated that past shortcomings
must be balanced against a proponent's promises for future
action.'78 The court concluded that the balancing of relevant
factors, including the lack of any threat to human health and the
lack of intentional violations, resulted in a finding that the handling
of radioactive wastes was adequately mitigated." 9
4. JudicialRemedies
Having found that the Regents' EIR was inadequate because it
didn't discuss future activities or alternatives to the project, the
court turned to the determination of how the situation should be
remedied."' Often, in this situation, California courts have simply
enjoined a project proponent from engaging in the activity
described in the faulty EIR."' In this case however, the California
Supreme Court held that the university could continue its present
activities at the Laurel Heights facility, pending certification of an
adequate EIR." In making this determination, the court construed
for the first time a 1984 amendment adding section 21168.9 to
CEQA's provisions."'

177. Id at 419, 764 P.2d at 301, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 449. In the past the California Department
of Health Services, after inspecting the radiation safety program at the Medical Center, concluded that
the university had a serious loss of control over radioactive material. Id. at 420, 764 P.2d at 301,253
Cal. Rptr. at 449.
178. Id. at 420, 764 P.2d at 301, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
179. Id The factors found to weigh in favor of the university included:
(1) There is no evidence UCSF's compliance difficulties resulted in any severe
danger or adversely affected human health in the slightest degree. (2) There is
no evidence of intentional violation. (3) UCSF appears to have attempted in
good faith to remedy its problems with radioactive substances. (4) The
handling of radioactive substances is closely regulated and monitored ....
Id.
180. IR at 422, 764 P.2d at 303, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
181. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing past remedies by California courts).
182. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 422, 764 P.2d at 303, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
183.
1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1213, sec. 1, at 4161 (enacting CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21168.9). See
supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing 1984 amendment).
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In considering whether to exercise its discretionary authority
to suspend all activity at the Laurel Heights site, the court relied on
traditional equitable principles used in similar cases arising under
federal environmental statutes.'" In determining the appropriate
remedy for the Laurel Heights case, the court adopted the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo."' In Weinberger, the Court
looked to the purpose of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
to order relief that would ensure compliance with the law.'86 The
Court determined that the ultimate inquiry under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act is whether the nation's waters are protected,
not whether the permit process had been rigidly adhered to.'87
Using similar reasoning, the California Supreme Court looked at
CEQA's purpose and found that the Act's primary purpose is to
protect the environment."8 The Regents' violations of CEQA
pertained to future activities and an inadequate analysis of
alternatives.'89 In weighing the equities, the California Supreme
Court's primary consideration was that there was no evidence to
show that the environment was being adversely affected by the
present activities at the Laurel Heights facility.'9" Furthermore, the
court felt that the university and the public could be unduly harmed
if the important research performed at the site was halted. 9 ' The

184. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 424, 764 P.2d at 304, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 452. See Selmi,
supranote 2, at 207 (describing situations in which California courts have looked to federal precedent
in the past to interpret CEQA).
185. Laurel Heights,43 Cal. 3d at 423,764 P.2d at 303,253 Cal. Rptr. at 451. See Wienberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (involving the Navy's alleged violation of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act for failure to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit
for weapons training in the Atlantic Ocean).
186. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 318. The Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of
Appeals' determination that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act withdrew a court's equitable
discretion to order relief other than an immediate prohibitory injunction. Md.at 314.
187. Id. at 314.
188. Laurel Heights, 43 Cal. 3d at 424, 764 P.2d at 304, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id Other concerns included the facts that the cost to move the university out of the facility
would ultimately be borne by the taxpayers, that the university could lose faculty and research funds,
and that the purpose of the university's research is to save fives. Id.

316

1991 / Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n

court, therefore, determined that the university's present activities
at the site could continue."9
Although current activities were allowed to continue, the court
did enjoin the addition of new types of operations and any
expansion of existing operations beyond the then-occupied 100,000
square feet of building space.'93 The court specified that even if
additional activities or expansion of space were identified in the
EIR, they could not be pursued until a new EIR was certified and
the project re-approved.'" While noting that the restriction on
expansion gave the Regents an incentive to correct the EIR in a
timely fashion, the court went further, and gave guidance
concerning what the EIR should contain in order to comply with
CEQA's requirements. 95 Specifically, the court counseled that
present activities already based at Laurel Heights could not be used
as a reason for rejecting feasible alternatives to that site.' 6 The
court also noted that should the Regents not proceed with a new
EIR in a timely manner, the trial court could reconsider whether
equitable relief terminating the operations at Laurel Heights would
be appropriate.'97
III.

LEGAL RANMIFICATIONS

In keeping with the tradition of broadly interpreting CEQA's
requirements, the Laurel Heights decision reaffirms the necessity
of making a good faith effort to adequately disclose information
pertaining to a proposed project's potential to adversely impact the

192. Id. at 424-25, 764 P.2d at 304, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 452. "Present activities" in this case
meant operations which existed at Laurel Heights facility at the time the court's opinion was filed.
Id.
193. Id.
194. Il
195. Id at 425, 764 P.2d at 305, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
196. IA "The Regents must begin anew the analytic process required under CEQA. We will
not accept post hoc rationalizations for actions already taken, particularly in light of the fact that
those activities were begun in violation of CEQA, even if done so in good faith." Id.
197. Il at 424, 764 P.2d at 304, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 452. The trial court's jurisdiction was to
continue until the Regents fully complied with CEQA. Id.
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environment. 93 Importantly, the decision highlights the necessity
to study meaningful alternatives to a proposed action.'" To
emphasize this point, the court specifically affirmed that a project
proponent could not gain any advantage by partially beginning the
project or action which is subject to CEQA, and then trying to gain
project approval piece by piece.'r Instead, the project proponent
must fully address the implications of the proposed project, both as
to present and future effects."s' The court also put to ret the
common mistaken assumption arising from the Laurel Hills
appellate decision, that a discussion of mitigation measures could
substitute for an analysis of alternatives within an EIR. 2
The Laurel Heights decision provides further clarification on
the minimum requirements necessary to adequately address
cumulative future impacts within an EIR 3 In interpreting CEQA
and its guidelines, the court announced a two step inquiry to
facilitate the determination of whether certain future plans must be
analyzed.2"4 Of significance is the fact that under the court's
inquiry it is objective facts, and not the subjective feelings or
statements of the decisionmaker, that determine the outcome of
whether a discussion of future impacts within the EIR is
required.Y In Laurel Heights, the court looked past the Regents'
justifications for excluding such information in the EIR and looked
at the substance of the evidence beyond the Regents' assertions."
This inquiry showed that sufficiently foreseeable uses were
contemplated. ' As a result, the court determined that an analysis
193. See supra notes 117-179 and accompanying text (discussing the adequacy of the Regents'
EmR).
199. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 399, 764 P.2d at 288, 353 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
200. Id. at 396, 764 P.2d at 285, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
201. IL
202. See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of the Laurel
Hills decision by the court).
203. See supra notes 123-140 and accompanying text (discussing when information concerning
proposed future activities is necessary).
204. Laurel Heights,47 Cal. 3d at 396,764 P.2d at 285,253 Cal. Rptr. at 433. See supra note
129 and accompanying text (describing the two part inquiry to determine if a discussion of future
activities should be part of an EIR).
205. l
206. Id. at 398, 764 P.2d at 286, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
207. A
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of cumulative future impacts was necessary.' The next step then
becomes how to remedy the situation.
In construing section 21168.9 of CEQA for the first time, the
court endorsed the use of equity principles as the proper judicial
inquiry to determine whether or not to exercise their authority to
enjoin an activity in violation of CEQA.' The court, by
following federal precedent to interpret new statutory language
contained in CEQA, reaffirmed that analogies to federal
environmental law are appropriate."' By looking at the equities
involved in cases where CEQA has been violated, the courts will
have greater freedom to fashion remedies dependent upon the
particular facts of the case at hand. 1' A wider variety of remedies
should allow compliance with the Act's requirements without
unduly delaying projects, or portions of projects, which have no
demonstrable adverse environmental effects. The danger of this
approach, however, is that courts relying on the equities of a case
may thus allow a party to get some benefit from an illegal
approval. It remains imperative that the remedy be fashioned with
this danger in mind.
The court's treatment of the mitigation measures presented in
the EIR was in keeping with its tradition of not becoming mired in
the technical merits of scientific inquiry.'
The substantial
evidence standard applied by the court requires resolution of
reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative findings.1 As
such, it will remain difficult to prove the inadequacy of information
which is thoroughly presented in an EIR, even if its presentation
arguably is not fully supported by fact.

208. d.
209. See supra notes 180-197 and accompanying text (discussing the court's analysis of the
proper judicial remedy).
210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the use of federal precedent in
early CEQA cases).
211. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing the courts' past remedies as an all
or nothing approach).
212. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the court's reluctance in the past
to make substantive determinations on the technical merits of the adequacy of an EmR).
213. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 407, 764 P. at 293, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
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Three areas of the court's decision, however, remain
problematic. First, because the supreme court distinguished the
Laurel Hills decision on the facts,214 future attempts to use the
heavily criticized Laurel Hills reasoning may be successful.
However, the court made it abundantly clear that in determining the
adequacy of an EIR, both mitigation measures and alternatives
must be presented." 5 Secondly, in regard to whether significant
impacts have been mitigated, the court was reluctant to question the
Regents' analysis.2"6 Again, it remains difficult to prove that
substantial evidence does not exist in the EIR where an issue has
been discussed at length, even if the factual conclusions are
questionable. Lastly, the court accepted the Regents' commitment
to monitor the environmental effects of its project as evidence of
mitigation.217 In Laurel Heights, the Regents were the proponent
of the project as well as the entity which approved the project, so
there was no independent oversight by a non-interested agency.
Recently, however, the California Legislature enacted a law to
require monitoring by an agency that approves a project where that
agency required project modifications to reduce environmental
impacts identified in an EIR." 8 Since a commitment to monitor
is now required by statute, a public agency's offer to monitor
should not be considered evidence of mitigation, but merely
compliance with the law.
IV. CONCLUSION

Through twenty years of application, it is likely that several
thousand CEQA complaints have been filed in California courts. In
its first decision interpreting the Act, Friends of Mammoth, the
California Supreme Court set the pace for a broad reading and
vigorous enforcement of CEQA's provisions. Since that time, the

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
conditions
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Id. at 402, 764 P.2d at 289, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
Id. at 403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
Id. at 411-412, 764 P.2d at 295-96, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 433-44.
Id. at 412, 764 P.2d at 296, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
See supranotes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing statutory requirement to monitor
placed on project approval).
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composition of the supreme court has shifted to a majority of
conservative appointments. As such, the court's enthusiasm for
enforcing a law often considered a thorn in the side of development
interests has come to be questioned. The Laurel Heights case was
the first CEQA dispute to reach the California Supreme Court
headed by Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas. Rather than softening its
interpretation of CEQA, a unanimous court recognized the
importance and viability of the Act. By its decision in Laurel
Heights, the California Supreme Court made it clear that it will
strongly enforce adherence to CEQA's mandate to fully inform the
public of potential adverse environmental effects through
preparation of thorough EIRs.
Amy L Glad
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